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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
ceedings,1- because profits of a business depend upon capital invested,
general business conditions, and the skill and business capacity of the
owners." This reasoning is undoubtedly sound if business losses are
non-compensable.
If, however, it is conceded that injury to a business is compensable, as the instant case holds, there ought to be no quarrel with the
admission of such evidence and a showing of its effect on the market
value of the property. In fact, where income such as rents and profits is derived from the intrinsic nature of the property itself, and
not from a business conducted thereon, such income is an element
to be considered in determining market value." And where the
business itself is being taken by the condemning authority, "' or being
paid for by statutory command," or where there is no other means
of determining market value2' evidence of profits has been admitted
as having probative value.
It is submitted that fundamental changes in policy with regard
to allowing recovery for business losses in eminent domain proceedings, where the principle of denial is so universally accepted, should
probably be wrought by legislative enactment rather than by judicial
decision.
Thomas D. Butler
JUDGMENTS-CONSENT TO JURISDICTION-USE OF HIGHWAY
BY NON-RESIDENT MOTORIST AS WAIVER OF FEDERAL
VENUE STATUTE. Plaintiffs, residents of Minnesota, were passengers in the vehicle of defendant A who was a resident of California.
This vehicle collided in Nebraska with that of defendant B, residents
of Iowa. Plaintiff sued in federal court in Nebraska, serving defendant B personally and defendant A by substituted service pursuant to
the provisions of the Nebraska non-resident motorist statute.' Defendant A appeared specially to object to venue and requested dismissal as to him. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss this motion and
requested transfer of the case to the District of Minnesota. In
asserting its jurisdiction and retaining the trial, the court held that
mere use of Nebraska roads by defendant A constituted a waiver of
the federal venue privilege 2 Kostamo v. Brorby, 95 F. Supp. 806
(D. Neb. 1951).
Remedial statutes have been passed in all states in an effort to
impose liability on "hit-and-run" non-resident drivers. New Jersey
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Los Angeles v. Deacon, 119 Cal. App. 491, 7 P.2d 378 (1932); Gauley
& E. Ry. v. Conley, 84 W.Va. 489, 100 S.E. 290, 292 (1919); see note,
7 A.L.R. 164 (1921).
Gauley & E. Ry. v. Conley, supra note 22.
Oregon Mesabi Corp. v. C. D. Johnson Lumber Corp., 169 F.2d 641,
644 (1948) (evidence of profits from ranch and farm lands admissible);
City and County of Denver v. Quick, 108 Colo. 111, 113 P.2d 999, 1001
(1941) (evidence of profit from livestock raising admissible).
Lebanon & Nashville Turnpike Co. v. Creveling, 159 Tenn. 147, 17 S.W.
2d 22, 26 (1929).
In re Board of Water Supply of City of New York, 211 N.Y. 174, 105
N.E. 213 (1914).
In rC State Reservation, 16 Abb. N.C. 159 (N.Y. 1884).
Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-530 (1943) Cum. Supp. (1949).
28 U.S.C. §1391 (a) (a civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only
on diversity of citizenship may.... be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or defendants reside).

RECENT CASES
pioneered in 1908 with an act which forbade the use of its highways
by a non-resident without first authorizing a state official to receive
service of process for him in actions arising out of the operation of
the motor vehicle within the state.' When constitutionally attacked
on the basis of the commerce clause, it was upheld.' Later, a Massachusetts statute provided that operation of a motor vehicle on its highways by a non-resident would be deemed equivalent to an appointment by him of a designated public officer as his attorney upon whom
process may be served.' It was upheld as not contravening the due
process clause. To satisfy the due process requirement, non-resident
motorist statutes generally provide that operation of the vehicle
shall be deemed signification of the non-resident's agreement that
any summons served under its provisions shall be of the same force
and validity as if personally served on him within the state.' Where
defendant has appeared specially to object to jurisdiction because he
has not personally receipted for the service mailed to him, it would
seem obvious that he has the notice requisite to confer jurisdiction.
Whereas Section 51. of the Judicial Code' restricts civil suits,
with the exception of corporate suits, to the district of defendant's
residence, defendant can waive all defenses and objections' either
held that
A landmark case'
by formal submission or by conduct.'
appointment by a corporation of an agent within the state to receive
service of process upon it constituted a waiver of the federal venue
privilege and subjected the corporation to suit in either the state
courts or the federal court within the state. Ironically, the fiction
employed in order to allow corporations to sue and be sued outside
of the chartering state was applied in reverse to expand the Neirbo
2
rule to actual persons served under a non-resident motorist statute.
While plaintiff could sue in the state court, defendant could have the
case removed to a federal court within the state whenever the
amount in controversy exceeded $3,000. As the jurisdiction of the
federal court on removal is, in a limited sense, derivative, the federal
jurisdiction, in diversity cases, wherever
court within a state obtains
'
Revision of the United States Code in
the state would have it.
19481" expanded the Neirbo doctrine and made it statutory in regard
to corporations, but did not alter .its application to the non-resident
motorist situation, where it has subsequently continued to be effective. ' However, in 1950 a contrary rule suddenly appeared, based
upon the realistic view that the agency was not consciously or voluntarily created." The legalistic weakness of this position is that all
Laws of New Jersey, p. 613 (1908).
4 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
• Mass. Gen. Laws c. 90, §3 (1921) as amended by Stats. Ch. 431 §2
2

a

(1923).

Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
E.g., N.Y. Cons. Laws, c. 71 Vehicle and Traffic Laws §52, as amended
by N.Y. Laws, c. 57 (1930).
28 U.S.C. §112.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (h).
1" Commercial Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1929).
21 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
22
Steele v. Dennis, 62 F.Supp. 73 (D.Md. 1945).
13 Buffington v. Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp., 94 F.Supp. 13 (W.D.Ark.

1950).

28 U.S.C. §1391 (a) (omitted "or may be found").
"5
Morris v. Sun Oil Co., 88 F.Supp. 529 (D.Md. 1950).
16 Martin v. Fishbach Trucking Co., 183 F.2d 53 (Ist Cir. 1950).
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persons are conclusively presumed to know the law; it has, however,
met with limited approval"' on the ground that the analogy to the
Neirbo case should be rejected.
As the federal venue statute was designed for the convenience
of defendants, it would seem that the involuntary waiver rule of the
instant case deprives the non-resident not of any substantial right,
but only of an advantage over residents. The majority view as
enunciated by the instant case, while admittedly fictitious, is not
only more consonant with justice but embraces elements which militate against the minority view, namely, (a) convenience of attending witnesses, (b) elimination of frequently unsatisfactory depositions,
(c) elimination of unnecessary expenses, (d) fairness to all who use
the highways.
Clinton R. Ottmar

REAL PROPERTY-ADJOINING LANDOWNERS-EASEMENTSLIGHT AND AIR. Plaintiff and defendant owned adjoining lots
which had been acquired through a common grantor. Defendant
erected a concrete wall ten feet high and three inches from the party
line and plaintiff's kitchen windows, thus preventing the free passage
of light and air. Plaintiff brought suit in equity to compel the defendant to remove the wall. The lower court decreed that the height
of the wall be reduced to six feet, having found that the common
grantor's subsequent separate conveyance created an easement of
light and air by implication because of necessity. Defendant appealed.
It was held that plaintiff had not established that defendant's land
had become the servient tenement; that there was no absolute
necessity upon which the court could base an implied easement, since
a small amount of light and air was admitted through the kitchen
windows, thus constituting only a partial obstruction; and that construction of a skylight in the kitchen ceiling would supply ample
amounts of light and air. Maiorella v. Arlotta, 364 Pa. 557, 73 A.2d
374 (1950).
An easement to light and air cannot, in Pennsylvania, be acquired by prescription.'
Neither is the English doctrine of ancient
lights a part of the law of that state,' that doctrine being in almost
complete disrepute in the United States.3 Easements to light and air
acquired by express grant are, however, recognized. 4 In that state
equity has also refused to order the removal of a wall shutting out
light and air, even where it was maliciously constructed, and of that
type commonly referred to as "spite fence", the court instead has
held that where a defendant is lawfully entitled to erect the wall
upon his land, the court will not inquire into the motive for so doing.' It would therefore seem obvious that the plaintiff in the instant
case had no alternative except to attempt to establish an easement
by implication because of necessity. This court held he had failed
Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F.Supp. 651 (E.D.Tenn. 1950).
Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368 (1859).
2 Beckershoff v. Bomba, 112 Pa. 294, 170 AtI. 449 (Super. Ct. 1934). "An,
cient lights" is the doctrine that long-continued enjoyment of lights and
windows creates a prescriptive right to continued unobstructed use therof.
3 Words and Phrases 388 (Perm. ed. 1940).
3 Humble, Limitations On The Use of Property By Its Owners, 5 Va. L.
Rev. 297, 306 (1918).
4 Rennyson's Appeal, 94 Pa. 147, 153 (1880).
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